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This article explores the ongoing confl  ict over state forest land between the local population and 
the State Forestry Corporation (SFC) in a village in upland Central Java with regard to authority 
formation. It looks at how diﬀ  erent agents draw on diﬀ  erent sources of authority in the course of 
the confl  ict and its negotiations. The principal questions are to what kind of sources of authority 
villagers refer to and how the formation of authority informs the relations between the state and 
society in the land dispute. The article is based on 11 months of ethnographic ﬁ  eldwork and focuses 
on the central ﬁ  gure of Pak Wahid who took a leading position in the forest land dispute and in 
mobilising peasants in the village. The article argues that in post-Suharto Java, leadership in the 
struggle for state forest land at the village level is embedded in the interaction of Javanese ideas of 
power and authority as well as administrative authority. Due to political and institutional reforms, 
new sources of authority could be invoked while there are no real changes in the power relations 
within the village or between the SFC and the villagers.
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Dieser Artikel untersucht den anhaltenden Konfl  ikt um staatliche Waldfl  ächen zwischen der lokalen 
Bevölkerung und der State Forestry Corporation (SFC) in einem Dorf im Hochland von Zentral-
Java in Bezug auf die Entwicklung von Autorität. Es wird untersucht, wie sich unterschiedliche 
AkteurInnen im Rahmen des Konfl  ikts und dessen Verhandlung auf unterschiedliche Bezugsquellen 
von Autorität beziehen. Die zentralen Forschungsfragen in diesem Zusammenhang sind, auf welche 
Bezugsquellen von Autorität sich DorfbewohnerInnen beziehen und wie die Entwicklung von 
Autorität die Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft im Rahmen des Landkonfl  ikts beeinfl  usst. 
Der Artikel basiert auf einer 11-monatigen ethnograﬁ  schen Feldforschung und fokussiert auf die 
Person von Pak Wahid, der eine Schlüsselrolle im Konfl  ikt um die staatlichen Waldfl  ächen und in 
der Mobilisierung von Bauern und Bäuerinnen einnahm. Der Artikel argumentiert, dass Führung 
im Kampf um staatliche Waldfl  ächen in post-Suharto Java in einem Zusammenspiel zwischen einer 
javanischen Vorstellung von Macht und Autorität und administrativer Autorität eingebettet ist. 
Aufgrund von politischen und institutionellen Reformen konnten neue Bezugsquellen von Autorität 
aktiviert werden, während keine wirklichen Veränderungen in den Machtverhältnissen innerhalb des 
Dorfes sowie zwischen SFC und den DorfbewohnerInnen zustande kommen.
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Introduction
This article discusses emerging authorities in dispute negotiations between local 
populations and the State Forestry Corporation (SFC) and other parties in Wonosobo 
district in Central Java. Conflicts over state forest land became visible after the fall of 
President Suharto in 1998, when the Indonesian authoritarian state (known as New 
Order) seemed to lose its hegemonic position and many local communities occupied 
land areas designated as state forest land. 
When discussing authority, many anthropologists draw on Weber’s division of 
authority systems into three different types: rational-legal, traditional, and charis-
matic, all of which contribute to processes of change in the world. In Weberian 
philosophy, the rational-legal form of authority was only possible in the West, while 
charismatic authority challenged rational and traditional forms (Weber, 1968, pp. 
217-219). Many anthropologists (Anderson, 1990; Antlöv, 1995; Geertz, 1980) have used 
this theoretical line of thought to discuss different forms of authority in Indonesia. 
Geertz (1980, pp. 124-126), for example, proposed a theory of the ceremonial theatre 
state and exemplary centre in South-East Asia. Accordingly, power is attractive rather 
than coercive since the leader manifests his power through ceremonies, thereby be-
coming an exemplary centre, something which only a powerful leader with certain 
qualities can achieve. Anderson (1990) has made similar suggestions using the exam-
ple of a king who embodies and exemplifies spiritual power through his behaviour 
(see also Siegel, 1986). 
Both these models have been applied when studying Javanese village leadership. 
In exploring leadership in Javanese New Order villages, Keeler (1985), for instance, has 
suggested that Javanese villagers “want very much to see in their headmen powerful 
leaders” (p. 114) in the sense of being ‘spiritually potent’ and thus a paternal figure to 
the villagers. In Keeler’s view, the villagers’ need for a powerful leader stems from a 
lack of strong formal (political) organisation (1985, p. 139), though he notes that vil-
lagers often resist a concentration of power by dividing their loyalties, which causes 
local tensions. The question then arises as to the required qualities of a “powerful 
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figure” in the Javanese context. Antlöv (1995), examining similar themes, suggests 
two bases of authority in New Order Java: community and administration. He argues 
that the Javanese rural elite comprises “privileged clients” of the state (anak mas – fa-
vourite children) whose opportunities to accumulate power and rule depend on their 
crucial links with higher authorities (pp. 6-7). Because of the need for these upper 
links the village headmen are stretched between the villagers and higher administra-
tive forces. Antlöv concludes that the New Order state reached all corners of a Sunda-
nese village (West Java) and any other source of authority could not be utilised at that 
level. Furthermore, he suggested that there was no possibility for upward mobility 
without total submission to the New Order regime. 
In the context of state formation in South-East Asia, Day (2001, p. 166), however, 
suggested that a clear demarcation between Western “rational” and indigenous “cer-
emonial states” is difficult to detect. Rather, “rational” bureaucratic organisation 
and the ritual state have become intertwined, forming a hybrid form of authority. 
Following this line of thought, I suggest that ideally we can distinguish two forms 
of power when we look at the formation of authority in Javanese villages: the Java-
nese idea of power (Anderson, 1990) and Western rational-legal knowledge or disci-
pline (Foucault, 1977). Though the administration became an increasingly important 
source of authority during the New Order, community-based authority (the Javanese 
idea of power) informs state formation (administration) and vice versa at the village 
level, and in the post-New Order Javanese village new sources could be invoked show-
ing the hybrid nature of the authority formation process. 
Following Day (2001, p. 34), I propose in this paper that the state as well as its 
subjects should be seen as agents with multiple resources and techniques within the 
context of given situations. In the authority building process, for example, agents 
draw from different sources (religion, myths, bureaucracy and legislation, extra-
state sources), thereby demonstrating the contested and hybrid nature of authority. 
My article will contribute to the discussion of power and authority with regard to 
land disputes in Java. I argue that in post-Suharto Indonesia rural leaders draw from 
different sources of culturally informed authority in processes that demonstrate that 
they are active agents in these disputes. Thus, my principal research question is: 
From what sources of authority do villagers draw and how does authority building 
inform this forest land dispute and the relations between the state and society? ASEAS 5(2)
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I conducted 11 months of ethnographic fieldwork between 2003 and 2004 in the 
forest village that I call Wanasana2 in Wonosobo district, with a specific focus on 
power relations between the actors in a dispute about rights of access to and con-
trol over actual state forest land and forests around the villages which were located 
close to state forest land. After 1999, the villagers of Wanasana, together with some 
NGOs, had taken the lead in demonstrating against the SFC – locally known as Perum 
Perhutani – in the district capital, taking over state forest land and planting crops 
and trees there. They claimed that they had rights as Indonesian citizens to benefit 
from state forest land and that they could manage it better than the SFC and thus 
protect the environment in Wonosobo. The discussion focuses on the case of Pak 
Wahid who took a leading position in the forest land dispute negotiations examined 
in this article. His case exemplifies the hybrid nature of authority formation and how 
some authority sources are more suitable than others in the Javanese village arena. 
As a former village head he contested the village head elections during my stay and 
was exposed in the media as the leader of the local peasants in their effort to take 
over the state forest land in Wonosobo. I argue that his active role in the dispute was 
partly due to his struggle with ‘Javanese’ values in his quest for power, values embed-
ded in the village bureaucracy to which he had belonged but from which he had had 
to withdraw for various reasons. 
Land Dispute in Wonosobo District, Central Java
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Kaliwiro sub-district – where Wanasana 
village is located – had become known as the worst area of forest destruction in Wono-
sobo. Many Wanasana villagers (and most probably some villagers from nearby) were co-
operating in an organised manner with outsiders, SFC staff, and the police in the devas-
tating felling of trees from the slopes around the village resulting in the loss of at least 10 
percent of the forest cover in Wonosobo district (Adi et al., 2004, pp.12-13; Lounela, 2009).3
2   The village names and names of the villagers mentioned in this article are pseudonyms.
3   The island of Java is divided into five provinces: West Java, East Java, Central Java, Banten, and Capital Territory 
of Jakarta with approximately 120 million inhabitants. Central Java, where Wonosobo district is located, is 
inhabited by 32.64 million people (2011) and covers 3.25 million hectares. There are 236 villages (desa), 154 of 
which are categorised as forest villages, and 29 village level administrative units that are part of the city or 
regency government (kelurahan) in Wonosobo. Wonosobo district is inhabited by about 758,078 people (Badan 
Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Wonosobo, 2012) while the village of this study is inhabited by 5,010 people.
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Wonosobo district is located north west of Yogyakarta, in the heart of Central 
Java, covering 98,468 hectares, 19,965 hectares of which are state forest land4 and 
19,472 hectares peoples’ forest (hutan rakyat) (Adi et al., 2004, p. 15; Nomura, 2008, 
p. 172). The state forest (about 19 percent of the total land area) is managed by the 
SFC with two different units operating in Wonosobo: The Southern Kedu Unit (9,728 
hectares) is mainly planted with pine trees, damar (Agathis alba), and teak, while the 
Northern Kedu Unit (9,967 hectares) is mostly planted with pine trees and mahogany 
(Switienia macrophylla) (Adi et al., 2004, p. 22). In 2000, forest cover in Wonosobo com-
prised about 38,368 hectares, including both state forest and peoples’ forest. 
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, large jungles had covered the Sin-
doro and Sumbing mountains when the area began to suffer from erosion because 
of uncontrolled tree felling (Boomgaard, 1996, pp. 20-21; Lounela, 2009, p. 66; Smiet, 
1990, p. 289). In response, the Dutch colonial government started reforestation pro-
grammes on the slopes which accelerated in the 1880s. By the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, the government had made new regulations requiring villagers to get a license 
to cut teak for which they had to pay a fee to the officials, and in 1875, a penal and 
police regulation on forestry matters was enacted (Boomgaard, 1996, p. 21; Lounela, 
2009, p. 68). The roots of the dispute can therefore be traced back to the Dutch colo-
nial period, when foresters entered Wanasana village to mark out areas designated 
as state forest land with wooden stakes, thereby limiting the access of local popula-
tions to those areas (Lounela, 2009). In 1945, Jawatan Kehutanan (the Indonesian For-
est Service) was founded, replacing the colonial SFC. In 1961, it was transformed into 
the General Head Body SFC (BPU Perhutani – Badan Pimpinan Umum Perhutani) and in 
1972, into the General State Forestry Corporation (Perum Perhutani) which, by 1978, had 
three main units: Unit I East Java (1961), Unit II Central Java (1961), and Unit III West 
Java (1978) (Departamen Kehutanan, 1986, p. 76; Peluso, 1992, p. 126). In the 1960s, 
Wanasana villagers related to me, they were told to cut the trees in their area and in 
the 1970s, pine trees (pinus merkurii) were planted ‘everywhere’. The villagers disliked 
pine trees, as they claimed that they caused water scarcity – which means that vil-
lagers’ rice fields had to be transformed into forest gardens –, and that pine needles 
made soil ‘hard’ (keras), killing other vegetation. However, the SFC maintained that 
4   These figures draw on data from the SFC, while the district government claims the state forest land to be 17,746 
hectares.ASEAS 5(2)
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pine trees were its main source of income and thus necessary for the corporation. 
SFC cooperated with the village functionaries to maintain ‘order’ and restrict access 
of the villagers to state forest land. Thus hidden tensions resulting in small-scale 
conflicts over forest access, have continually occurred over a long period of time, 
demonstrating the ongoing nature of the dispute (Lounela, 2009). 
The parties to the Wonosobo land dispute were principally the forest village peas-
ants and the SFC. The SFC is administratively divided into district, provincial, and 
central levels, but it does not follow state administrative boundaries and has its own 
administrative system. The organisation includes the Management Unit (Central Of-
fice and Director), the Forest Management District Unit (KPH – 20 units in Central 
Java), led by an administrateur or ADM, the Forest Management Sub-District Unit 
(BKPH, 7 units in the Kedu Selatan Forest District Unit), led by a supervisor (asper), 
which includes the Ngadisono Forest Sub-District Unit, and, finally, the Forest Police 
Unit led by a forester head or mantri. In Wonosobo district, state forest management 
is divided between the KPH Kedu Selatan and KPH Kedu Utara Units. During my field-
work, the leading role in the negotiations at the district level was filled by the ADM at 
the KPH Kedu Selatan Unit (Purworejo), while at the village level the asper and mantri 
played a big part in negotiating with the villagers. However, the Central Unit and 
Director, located close to the Ministry of Forestry in Jakarta, had superior authority 
over other units. The other parties to the dispute were NGOs, state officials at the 
central (Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Forestry), district, and sub-district 
levels, police, and some academics. Different levels of government assumed differ-
ent roles, demonstrating that the state in Indonesia is not monolithic. For instance, 
at one stage the district government, led by the district head (bupati), was heavily 
promoting state forest management by the local communities through regional regu-
lations on community-based forest management, but the central government (Min-
istry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Forestry) eventually put a stop to these efforts 
after extensive lobbying from the SFC, which rejected the district government and 
bupati policies (Adi et al., 2004, p. 29).
The dispute was quite extraordinary in the Javanese context: For decades, the SFC 
control over state forest land had been almost total, exercised through the smallest 
Resort Polisi Hutan (RPH – Forest Police Unit) that patrolled the forestry sub-district, 
comprising a mantri and a team of four mandors. The units could summarily arrest 
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people and take them to the state police for further processing and, indeed, many 
Wanasana villagers recounted experiences of mandors chasing them if they took 
branches or wood from the state forest area during the New Order period (Lounela, 
2009; see also Peluso, 1992). When President Suharto and the New Order regime fell 
in 1998, many forest peasants participated in taking over these state forest lands 
claiming they could better manage and protect the forest than the SFC. According to 
them, the local gardens were fertile and green with multiple tree species, fruits, and 
crops which provided both cash and subsistence harvests, and this should serve as 
an exemplar for state forest management. Between 1999 and 2001, in a multi-stake-
holder forum, some NGOs and the district government drafted a Regional Regula-
tion on community-based forest management (Perda PSDHBM 22/2001). However, the 
district head at that time, Trimawan Nugrohadi, faced difficulties in furthering the 
implementation of the regulation because the central government started to oppose 
it. At the same time, the head of the District Assembly Commission, B. C. Krustanto, 
and the vice-district head, H. Abdul Kholiq Arif (from here on Pak Kholiq), were vocal 
in their support of the regulation. Disappointed with it, the SFC withdrew from the 
negotiation forum (rejoining it at a later point) and claimed that the Perda PSDHBM 
was countermanding a superior national law (UU 41/1999), which established the SFC 
as power holder over state forest lands in Java. In 2002, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
asked for cancellation of the regulation, which caused new tensions that continued 
during my stay between 2003 and 2004 and afterwards. 
The fieldwork for this article was inevitably multi-sited because of the many are-
nas wherein the control over state forest land was disputed. Here, however, I focus 
on the village arena as represented by Wanasana, a village of about 5,010 inhabitants 
in 2002. Wanasana spreads along the main asphalted road that runs from Prembun 
to the city of Wonosobo. Above the village, the hills marked out as state forest land 
had been planted with pine trees, which were all cut down between 1998 and 2003 
by ‘illegal loggers’ with the naked sandy slopes then being planted with maize, chili, 
cassava, banana trees, and later sengon (albizzia, Paraserianthes falcataria) by the vil-
lagers. Beyond the boundaries of the state forest area spreads land owned by the 
villagers, a landscape of green and abundant forest gardens, where the villagers plant 
bananas, coconuts, and various other trees and crops. The peoples’ forest, planted 
with various tree species, has been considered an example of sustainable and eco-ASEAS 5(2)
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logically sound forest management. The land area disputed (72.5 hectares during my 
stay) is located in the mountains, which were territorially demarked as the South-
ern Kedu Unit by the SFC. It is administratively part of the Ngadisono Sub-District 
Forestry Unit that covers 6,491 hectares and spreads across seven villages which are 
categorised as forest villages as they are located in close proximity to state forest 
land. In this article, I wish to explore how authority building informs this forest land 
dispute and its settlement efforts, particularly in Wanasana, one of the seven forest 
villages that had a visible role in the protests and negotiations through the actions of 
the active peasant leader Pak Wahid.
Building Authority in the Village Through the Forest Land Dispute
Authority building in the village by Pak Wahid, a man in his 40s, became related to 
the land dispute after 1999. Pak Wahid took a lead in mobilising peasants in the seven 
villages bordering on the Ngadisono Forestry Sub-District (the SFC forest manage-
ment unit) to take over state forest land and negotiate access to it. He told me that, 
in 2000, he had become extremely depressed when he saw the destruction of a pine 
tree plantation that had surrounded and shielded the local ‘power place’, considered 
to be the ‘centre of the world’ by its local guardian and many of the villagers. Pak 
Wahid decided that something should be done both to reforest the land and provide 
work for those who had lost their income when they were no longer needed to man-
age the plantations. 
Due to the land scarcity and unequal land distribution in Wanasana (as in Java and 
Wonosobo in general), there were 80 villagers who did not own land at all (numpang) 
and land ownership averaged out at only 0.37 hectare. In 2002, about 40 families owned 
more than one hectare of land each. Following the inheritance system, each child in 
the family got a plot of the same size for a garden, housing, or a rice field and as a 
consequence, land ownership has become extremely scattered. Thus, many families 
were in need of agricultural land and were eager to have access rights to state land for 
this purpose (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Wonosobo, 2002; Lounela, 2009, p. 112). 
Frustrated and distressed by forest destruction, Pak Wahid described how he called on 
the heads of the seven villages in the Ngadisono Forestry Sub-District to take part in an 
Anu Lounela - Contesting State Forests in Post-Suharto IndonesiaASEAS 5(2)
217 216
agreement he intended to make with the staff of the Kedu Selatan Unit of the SFC. In 
2000, the seven village heads, under Pak Wahid’s leadership, demanded that the SFC 
grow only teak trees in the blocks (petak in the language of the SFC) of the Ngadisono 
Forestry Sub-District Unit, with the provisos that peasants should be able to get a 
share of harvests, and they should be able to plant some crops under the teak trees. 
In spring 2001, some forest village peasants (led by Pak Wahid) agreed with the SFC 
to replace pine trees with teak trees in the Ngadisono Forestry Sub-District Unit. The 
parties had agreed that Block 11C (72.5 hectares) would be planted with teak and that 
other blocks would be 40 percent teak and 60 percent pine (in SFC language called 
vourbou blocks, altogether 115.2 hectares). While SFC decided to withdraw from the 
Wonosobo multi-stakeholder forum negotiations, it allowed villagers to plant crops 
and some tree species on the state forest land, and negotiated directly with them.
In March 2003, soon after my arrival in the village, I witnessed the last land dis-
tribution concerning Block 11C above the village in the hills, an event organised by 
Pak Wahid. Other land distribution events had been organised before my arrival. The 
villagers now had temporary access to state forest land and they were able to have 
some say in what to plant and harvest there. On a sunny day, Pak Wahid had called 
for a “mutual liberation” (musyawarah) to be held at the state forest block that bor-
dered on Wanasana. This musyawarah was called to gain consensus (mufakat) on land 
size and compensations, and to create a new peasant group under a peasant organi-
sation called Mandiri. About 46 peasants arrived on foot or by motorcycles, mostly 
middle-aged or older men. About 35 people had registered beforehand with Pak Wa-
hid in order to take part in the land sharing. The amount of land to be shared was 2.5 
hectares, which was part of Block 11C. “We will share this land fairly and equally with 
those who do not have land yet,” Pak Wahid proclaimed at the beginning of the meet-
ing and then asked people to give their names. By the end of the day, there were 46 
claims to the piece of land – everybody was to get a 480 m2 plot with temporary land 
rights. This allocation of land rights differed from the SFC arrangements, according 
to which peasant day-labourers (pesanggem) were given the right to grow cassava 
for the first three years of the pine tree plantation management, as now the villagers 
independently decided who got rights to the land and what to plant there. At that 
time villagers thought they could gain long-term access to the area. ASEAS 5(2)
217 216
To implement the land distribution, Pak Wahid put together a team that would be 
responsible for measuring and marking out plots in the field, and whom he invited 
to meet in Pak Winaryo’s house. Although poor and owning only a small piece of 
land, Winaryo was often involved in village head elections as a supporter of one of 
the candidates (and I was told that the candidate he supported won most of the elec-
tions). He was entitled to cultivate a piece of the village head’s land (tanah bengkok) 
through the sharing system and, owing to his alliance with the village elite (especially 
the village head), he was an important gatekeeper of peasant organisations in the vil-
lage. Besides, he was said to have spiritual power which he could use for good or bad 
purposes. Pak Wahid seemed to make sure that Pak Winaryo was involved in peas-
ant mobilisation. As with those villagers who had been involved in forest stripping 
and violent clashes with the SFC, these forms of power offered important sources of 
authority.
Community bases of authority, therefore, included interpersonal relationships and 
the capacity to communicate with spirits and ancestors who were tied to the land 
and guarded it. The day after the meeting and the measuring of land plots, a for-
est ritual (selamatan) was held on the land in order to pacify the forest spirits, get 
their support and protection, and prevent conflicts among the peasants and between 
peasants and the SFC. Everybody was asked to submit to the decisions on compensa-
tions which were already made and to the sizes of the plots as they had been marked 
out. During the ritual Pak Wahid distributed small portions of food to everybody and 
Islamic prayers were offered. The peasants’ effort to take control of the land was 
now blessed by the spirits, which would prevent conflicts between all the parties 
involved. 
In the course of time I realised that for every tree planting or land sharing, a 
kind of ritual feast was led by Pak Wahid. Here, ritual was not only a local act but 
expressed a hybrid setting (Spyer, 1996, p. 43). Rituals made the forest work of the 
peasants public and integrated them into the larger political field in which district 
government officials, party members, union leaders and members, and even local re-
ligious figures were invited to take part. Thus, these ritual feasts translated peasant 
union, NGO activism, and universal principles, such as peasants’ rights to land, into 
local language and belief. At the same time, the authority of villagers as legitimate 
rights holders was confirmed, as the spirits were on their side and would support 
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their struggle. This community-based authority was important to Pak Wahid. He had 
the power to ask permission and blessings from the spirits, making him a proper 
leader in a Javanese sense. There were, for example, many narratives told of angered 
forest spirits who caused trees to fall on people due to their misbehaviour in the 
area, and only powerful people were considered able to communicate with them and 
calm them down. Pak Wahid could also effectively negotiate in the conflict with the 
SFC and thus make it possible to reproduce the villagers’ relations to the land and 
surrounding “nature” (alam). In addition, Pak Wahid added to his authority by con-
stantly organising ritual feasts (selamatan) in the forests or in relation to state forest 
land events, thereby further legitimising his position as a peasant leader.
Peasant Organisations and Authority Building
Pak Wahid, who had been recruited by the central Javanese peasant union SEPKUBA5, 
started to mobilise peasants in his and neighbouring villages in support of the Re-
gional Regulation Perda PSDHBM and peasants’ rights to state forest land in the 
hope that peasants could continue to manage state forest lands through independ-
ent peasant organisations and share the harvest with SFC, with which they were in 
continual negotiation. This support took the form of demonstrations in which villag-
ers (though not the village elite) and NGOs took part. Sometimes hundreds or even 
thousands of peasants from different villages demonstrated in front of the District 
Assembly building demanding new tree species for the state forest or refusing pine 
trees, and demanding the implementation of the new district regulation and the can-
cellation of the new forest management institutions created by the SFC respectively. 
The latter refer to the PHBM [forest management together with the community] and 
the LMDH [the forest village community institution] (DTE No. 55 Nov. 2002). In most 
cases the local NGO JKPM (Jaringan Kerja Pemuda Muslim) and SEPKUBA together with 
a smaller NGO called KOLING, mobilised the rallies. 
Pak Wahid’s own narrative, which he related to me in 2003, depicted him as the 
‘hero’ in leading the negotiations and reaching agreement with the SFC; he felt he 
5   SEPKUBA (Serikat Petani Kedu, Banyumas – Kedu and Banyumas Peasant’s Union) is a local peasant union that 
was formed in 1999. It played an important role in visiting villages and building networks among the villagers, 
‘strengthening’ them at the villages, and representing forest peasants in the district level meetings. ASEAS 5(2)
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had started the negotiations which led to this outcome. In his narrative, the peasants 
were a strong force that had pressured the SFC until they were obliged to negotiate. 
Pak Wahid had further invited villagers to gather and share the state forest land plots 
in order to cultivate cash crops during unspecified periods and demand rights of ac-
cess to land and the opportunity to plant new tree species. Pak Wahid’s authority in 
this organisation and in village negotiations was recognised by everybody, although I 
was told that he dominated discussions and produced long monologues at the meet-
ings. Yet, the villagers also had vivid memories of the 1960s and the military coup of 
President Suharto, when it became extremely dangerous to participate in anything 
other than state approved organisations. Everybody knew about the killings of hun-
dred thousands of people who were considered communists and the imprisonment 
of many others. These violent events completely changed the political landscape, 
and no political mobilisation outside of extreme state control was possible due to 
the fear of punishment (Hadiz, 2011, p. 52). During the New Order government, peas-
ant mobilisation took place through the official village peasant organisations which 
became channels for New Order development efforts, especially those connected 
with Green Revolution projects. Land reform or land claims were delicate issues that 
nobody would raise because of the fear of risking their lives. Pak Wahid told me that 
he was sometimes suspected of being a communist and his civil society connections 
were not at all approved by most of the village elite. 
After the land distribution mentioned above, a new group, Supitan (an independ-
ent Forest Peasant Organisation or Kelompok Tani Hutan [KTH]), was formed by the 
people who had been given land plots in Block 11C. This organisation became part 
of the umbrella organisation Mandiri that was led by Pak Wahid. For several dec-
ades, the SFC had been creating village peasant organisations to manage the pine 
tree concessions around Wonosobo. Villagers who got a piece of land automatically 
became members in the SFC KTH, and ideally they were invited to meetings and had 
the responsibility of taking care of the plants or trees in their blocks and of following 
the rules of the organisation. When illegal loggings started, the SFC KTH in the vil-
lage ceased to function. In 2001, Pak Wahid called on villagers managing state forest 
land and asked them to join the Mandiri KTH (mandiri translates as “independent”, 
referencing the fact that it was not an official SFC organisation), the umbrella for the 
KTHs that operated in certain forest blocks. Under the Mandiri organisation, there 
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were six KTHs and, under them, 32 smaller Local Peasant Organisations (Organisasi 
Tani Lokal [OTL]) whose individual members managed the state forest blocks (with an 
approximate number of 20–35 members per OTL). By the time I resided in the village, 
Pak Wahid claimed that there were 850 peasant members in six organisations in Wa-
nasana and neighbouring villages. 
Pak Wahid included some heads of various neighbourhoods (Rukun Tetangga [RT]) 
in the organisation who were important allies for him as they could mobilise villagers 
in their immediate locales. He did not, however, invite the hamlet head (mentioned 
as advisor of the organisation), village head, or those officially part of the village 
power structure (perangkat desa) to most of the meetings. I argue that this was be-
cause they would have undermined Wahid’s authority as they were above him in the 
village power structure, but also because they were his relatives. Nonetheless, the 
entire village elite was invited to the official inauguration meeting of the Mandiri 
organisation.
During my stay, Pak Wahid became a candidate in the village head elections. He had 
been village head in the mid-1990s, but due to various reasons (his struggle against cor-
ruption in the village elite, a scandalous extra-marital relationship) he had to withdraw 
after only one year. The village elite claimed that for this reason he was not a ‘proper’ 
leader or village head candidate as he could not control his emotions. However, his 
supporters considered him to be the man who had fought against corruption and au-
thoritarian rule in the village and the only person who has the power to mobilise peas-
ants to occupy state forest lands and negotiate with the SFC. Here, a different idea of 
authority building emerged legitimising Pak Wahid’s work and position.
In his youth, Pak Wahid had been active first in the PPP (Islamic Union Party) and 
then (unofficially) in the PKB (National Awakening Party), which is a Muslim organisa-
tion. He had turned to the religion of Islam as a potential source of authority at that 
time, since the head of an Islamic boarding school (pesantren) located in the village 
had an almost familial relationship with his family. Pak Wahid had received his educa-
tion from the pesantren, and his mother’s uncle had given one hectare of land to the 
local Islamic leader (the Kiyai) to build a mosque and a pesantren, thereby adopting 
the leader into the family. Now, Pak Wahid stressed his ‘modernist’ Islamic or santri 
(more egalitarian than the Javanese hierarchical order, he claimed) orientation in the 
face of the village bureaucracy. However, it soon became clear that Pak Wahid did ASEAS 5(2)
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not fulfil the new criteria for village head elections because he had only a primary 
school certificate and, according to new district legislation, he should have at least 
a secondary school certificate. With Wahid disqualified, there was finally only one 
remaining candidate who, not surprisingly, won the election.
Before the village head elections in 2003, Pak Wahid had mobilised hundreds of 
people in the distribution of land and many of them became his supporters in the vil-
lage head elections. He also involved NGOs and peasant organisations at the village 
level, which was considered problematic by the village elite as civil society actors 
were often regarded as opposing the state or connected to communists. Some village 
elite members told me that Pak Wahid was self-interested (pamrih), too outspoken, 
and had a past which was inappropriate for a village head. However, his outspoken-
ness and active role were qualities necessary for a land dispute negotiator or peasant 
movement leader. Again, the qualities suitable for the village head and peasant or-
ganiser seemed to differ a great deal, an issue I will explore in the following sections.
When the village head elections were over in July 2003, Pak Wahid’s state forest ac-
tivities increased dramatically, partly due to his disqualification. In August 2003, the 
peasant organisation he led was formalised in the village through an event (upacara), 
whereby Mandiri was named the village peasant organisation and became linked to 
the state. The practical aim of this move was to enable problem-free funding from 
the state as the district government was now demanding that organisations be of-
ficially recognised and fulfil certain criteria. The more obvious aim was to ritually 
publicise the authority of the organisation and Pak Wahid’s authority to take over the 
forest land issue in the village. However, at the same time, the organisation ceased 
to be an independent peasant movement (as it was described in some places) and 
formally became a bureaucratic-rational organisation in the Weberian sense. 
In the following weeks I could see Pak Wahid coming and going from the SFC 
office and organising peasant group meetings, which the NGOs and SEPKUBA some-
times attended. Furthermore, the SEPKUBA leader spent a lot of time in the village 
(or in the neighbouring Selokerto village), and often slept in Wahid’s house. His visits 
in the village were supposed to strengthen and legitimise Pak Wahid’s position and 
struggle for access to state forest land. In September 2003, about 60 villagers built a 
road to the state forest land as part of the programme. Similarly, another road was 
constructed in the following month. By the end of October 2003, the villagers, in co-
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operation with SFC staff, planted mahogany seedlings on a plot which Pak Wahid had 
rented from a neighbour. The plan was to start planting mahogany in the state forest 
when the seedlings were high enough.
In a meeting held in the SFC office in the village in October 2003, seven staff mem-
bers were present from the SFC with a higher officer from the Southern Kedu Unit 
office. Wahid arrived with a relative of his who was also a member of a peasant or-
ganisation from the neighbouring Selokerto village, and another man who belonged 
to the inner circle of the organisation, but whom I never saw taking part in forest 
management. Senior SFC staff took over the forum, outlining what was expected 
from the forest peasant groups: organisational structure, identity cards for all mem-
bers, a forest management plan with all the details and calculations of capital input 
from the peasants. This meeting could be described as a turning point in the nego-
tiation of the rights to state forest land at the village level as the position of the SFC 
staff was far stronger in the face of the few villagers present. Pak Wahid, meanwhile, 
seemed to be willing to accept the conditions set by the SFC. 
The growing power of the SFC in village negotiations derived partly from the in-
secure and confusing situation at the district level where the district government 
was forced to cancel the Regional Regulation on community-based forest manage-
ment which would have allowed peasants to have power over state forest land man-
agement surmounting that of the SFC. From 2000 on, Pak Wahid supported the lo-
cal vice-district head, Pak Kholiq, from the Islamic-oriented PKB party. In 2004, Pak 
Kholiq campaigned for the position of district head, supporting the implementation 
of the Regional Regulation Perda PSDHBM and the local villagers in their efforts to 
continue their own state forest land management system; he achieved his goal in 
2005 (“Bupati Wonosobo,” 2005). Simultaneously, however, the SFC was lobbying the 
central and provincial governments which had superior power over the district gov-
ernment. During my stay in Wanasana, there were two forest management models 
(the district regulation-based PSDHBM and the SFC-based PHBM) circulating in the 
forest villages. Wanasana, as with many other villages, was now negotiating directly 
with the SFC, and NGOs facilitated this process to ‘strengthen’ them, but PSDHBM or 
community-based forest management did not have a clear legal basis. Furthermore, 
losing in the village head elections significantly reduced Pak Wahid’s authority in the 
eyes of the SFC, the villagers, and the bureaucratic village elite alike. Villagers became ASEAS 5(2)
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increasingly marginalised in district level settlement efforts and even at the village 
level they had limited say. When I visited the village in 2009, the SFC had founded an 
‘official’ forest peasant organisation (KTH) in the village, and Pak Wahid’s role as a 
peasant leader was unclear. 
Why did Pak Wahid have difficulties in connecting with the village elite while he 
was recognised as the right person to lead peasant mobilisation and land distribu-
tion and negotiations with the SFC, at least initially? One reason was his linkage 
with extra-state actors who, on the one hand, became the source of his authority, 
but, on the other hand, challenged it because the village elite associated NGOs with 
the ‘left’: They were considered dangerous because they criticised the state, which 
during President Suharto’s period was considered a subversive act likely to result 
in a prison sentence. The other reason relates to factors of status and tradition as 
a source of authority that have become embedded in the Javanese administration. 
Leadership in this land dispute was mostly based on different qualities of leadership 
than village leadership, as I will describe below.
Tradition as a Source of Authority
Ward Keeler has noted that in Javanese society all interaction is about status (Keeler, 
1987, pp. 26–27; Siegel, 1986). Behaviour and speech in an interaction signify people’s 
status and one’s position in the village structure and in the community. In the an-
thropological literature, Javanese custom or tradition – customary law (adat) – has 
been defined as the cosmos and the norms and principles that direct Javanese in 
their interactions (Anderson, 1990; Antlöv, 1995; Keeler, 1987; Pemberton, 1994). Such 
norms as being refined (halus) or being coarse (kasar), maintaining harmony (rukun), 
and working voluntarily for the community (gotong royong) have been mentioned as 
major principles in Javanese village custom. Siegel (1986, pp. 15–17) has effectively 
described how in a Javanese encounter speaking correctly is also behaving correctly, 
having social and linguistic implications. Javanese speech has different levels that 
mark the status of the speaker. By using the right level of language and tone (ngoko 
or kromo) one avoids upsetting the other partner to the exchange; sentences are for 
the listener, not for the speaker. 
Anu Lounela - Contesting State Forests in Post-Suharto IndonesiaASEAS 5(2)
225 224
The notion of respect informs authority building in the village. Younger people, 
whatever their position, should offer respect to their elders. The village functionaries 
and other high status persons should be respected by those in lower positions. At 
the same time, if one fails to be respected, it is difficult to have authority in the eyes 
of the villagers. It is obvious that one should respect the elite members of the com-
munity and any kind of resistance (disrespect) is often interpreted by the village elite 
as harsh behaviour or stupidity. Pak Wahid was obviously considered ‘harsh’ because 
he was outspoken, contested village functionaries openly, and mobilised people in 
the village through peasant meetings and forest-related activities. Pak Wahid was 
a former village head and he had experience (perjuangan) in working for the village. 
He had, however, been expelled from his position because of his extra-marital affair 
and because, according to the new legislation, he did not fulfil the criteria for formal 
leadership (lacking a certificate of secondary education) and was therefore ineligible 
as a candidate. In other words, his power (in the Javanese sense) diminished quite 
suddenly, which in Javanese thinking may imply that his power had moved to some-
one else (Siegel, 1986, p. 36). Certainly, he could no longer gain support from the vil-
lage elders and the village elite. 
Ruling effortlessly is an important sign of one’s power in Java (Siegel, 1986, p. 37) 
while using force is a sign of weakness. A Seloman hamlet head stated that he does 
not have to order (menyuruh) peasants to do anything, preferring that local neigh-
bourhood heads see that community members do what is asked. Thus, he meets 
the smallest neighbourhood unit heads (RT) or sends them letters, and they pass 
information and directives onto those living in their locales. The village functionaries 
often noted that it is difficult to order or ask villagers to do something (especially 
those in a higher position or elders) because it does not feel comfortable. Tidak enak 
refers to the feeling (rasa) of being afraid of hurting somebody or lowering oneself 
by being harsh (kasar). 
The inability or unwillingness to order or ask people to do something may relate 
to two core values of Javanese adat: rasa and pamrih. When theorising about Javanese 
culture in relation to Javanese administration, Anderson (1990, p. 54) suggested that 
the implications of Javanese cultural values encourage people not to act, lest they ap-
pear as if they wanted to gain something for themselves. Antlöv (1995, p. 164) claims 
that Sundanese leadership has been very much based on traditional authority even ASEAS 5(2)
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in the state domain. Keeler (1987), deriving from Anderson (1990), relies on the idea 
of the potent king as a culturally directing image of a suitable leader, village head 
or lurah. In this sense, Pak Wahid’s visible efforts to become a village head, and his 
activities concerning state forest land, raised suspicions and were sometimes inter-
preted as pamrih. The village elite seemed not to support his activities for this reason. 
The New Order elite rested on the idea of a power-full leader, from the village up 
to the highest level of governance. It was visible in the way village officials governed 
and directed a village: effortlessly. During the New Order, if there were a problem 
in a village, as one elder village functionary told me, Brimob (Mobile Brigade – the 
Indonesian national police special operations force unit) would be called in, and they 
also used to arrive regularly and without invitation for larger village meetings (lapa-
nan). In these cases the passive governance of the village elite became linked with the 
feared and violent state (police) in a curious way, given that the New Order regime 
used fear and violence to create order and stability (Siegel, 1986, p. 37). 
Drawing on Foucault, Pemberton (1994) has criticised ethnographers for strength-
ening the New Order discourse on Javanese core values that marginalised struggles 
and conflicts. He claims that New Order discourse on Javanese culture and politics 
produced an ideology that stressed harmony, stability, and family-ness (kekeluargaan) 
to suppress conflicts (the negative side of selamatan) (pp. 14-15). New Order village 
elites stressed order and stability, marginalising harsh and disrespectful behaviour as 
dangerous. In this light, Pak Wahid’s active role contradicted the dominant discourse 
of Javanese cultural identity as stressed by the New Order regime. Pak Wahid had to 
struggle with the village elite and SFC, while the support from the NGOs and peasant 
union were not enough to strengthen his position, or sometimes even undermined it, 
and for this reason Wanasana villagers failed to secure rights to the state forest land. 
In post-Suharto Java, however, it was possible for Pak Wahid to struggle for power 
and be supported by those parts of the village which had taken part in the land dis-
pute, because of his extra-state sources of authority and the fall of a regime which 
had been shown to be corrupt in many ways. 
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Conclusion
I have explored how people draw from different sources of authority in a post-Suhar-
to, upland Javanese forest village in their struggle for state forest land. Taking a hybrid 
view on the formation of authority, my principal questions were: From what sources 
of authority do villagers draw and how does authority formation inform this forest 
land dispute and the relations between the state and society? 
The case study examined here clearly indicates that the ideal of an exemplary 
centre and a powerful leader and authoritative figure informs authority building at 
the village level. However, as noted by Keeler (1987), villagers tend to resist the con-
centration of power in one person by distributing their loyalty and building alliances 
with many authority figures in order to reduce their dependency and protect their 
personal sovereignty. Thus, authority building is a two-way process: People build 
their authority by using different sources, on the one hand, and distribute their loy-
alty and create patron-client relations with numerous people, on the other. In the 
case of Pak Wahid, he gained followers by mobilising people in the land dispute, but 
the same people also built alliances with the village functionaries and his opponents 
in the village head elections who had upward connections.
During the New Order period, the bureaucracy became a dominant power source 
in ordering the lives of people. Bureaucracy was, however, informed by Javanese ide-
as of authority and power. Those owning land or belonging to powerful or wealthy 
families could gain a position in the official structure where they should behave ac-
cording to their status position – passively, in a word. The New Order regime rheto-
ric stressed stability (stabilitas) as the basis of the Indonesian nation state, and the 
positions of the village elite and staff were related to a reinforcement of this order. 
Order was further buttressed by an imposed hierarchy and constant references to 
such concepts as kasar, halus, and pamrih in the village. However, new kinds of ra-
tionales for authority emerged too: Those having material wealth or education could 
gain authority as long as they were loyal to the ruling party (GOLKAR) and the state 
(Pancasila6). 
6   Pancasila refers to the state philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia, i.e. 1) the belief in one God, 2) humanity that 
is just and civilised, 3) the unity of Indonesia, 4) democracy guided by the wisdom representative deliberation, and 
5) social justice for all Indonesians. ASEAS 5(2)
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Due to the changes in national politics (decentralisation), the withdrawal of Presi-
dent Suharto, public criticism of corrupt bureaucracy and politicians, and open con-
testation over state forest land new sources could be invoked. Villagers who wanted 
to gain access to land created patron-client relations with Pak Wahid (the landless 
or poor, illegal loggers, and jobless) and became his followers in the land struggle. 
For many, however, Pak Wahid was considered too active, harsh, and outspoken to 
become a village head, but these qualities became the basis of his authority in the 
land dispute making it possible for him to lead negotiations in the village and with 
the SFC. 
In post-Suharto Java, leadership in the struggle for state forest land at the village 
level is embedded in the interaction of ‘traditional’ authority and administrative au-
thority. Modern authority and village leadership are informed by certain Javanese 
qualities considered suitable for a leader. However, the villagers have new sources 
of authority due to national and local political changes. These new sources seemed 
to open space for innovative kinds of negotiations and to challenge the power of the 
SFC or traditional authority figures, while not bringing any real transformation of the 
power structure in the village or of that between the SFC and the villagers.
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